Nari Kim’s Three Minute Thesis
What makes a CEO more aggressive? A CEO’s decision horizon and earning manipulations
Despite of extensive studies on the CEO horizon problem, few studies have explored it from perspective of opportunistic behavior. Building on agency theory, we examine how a CEO’s concerns on labor market evaluation guide his/her opportunistic behavior. Specifically, we found that a CEO in the pre-departure period is more motivated to engage in severe financial fraud. Given that severe fraud has negative influence on the firm, the economy, and society, it is important to know the ways to prevent it. Our results suggest that both internal governance (e.g. CEO duality, compensation structure, and auditor monitoring) and external governance (e.g. legal regulation) successfully mitigate a CEO’s aggressiveness in financial fraud.
Nari Kim’s Powerpoint presentation can be viewed here.
Nari Kim is a Ph.D. candidate in business administration with concentration in management at Washington State University, Carson College of Business. Prior to beginning the Ph.D. program, Nari received her master’s degree in industrial/organizational psychology from State University of New York at Albany. Her research interests include corporate wrongdoings, firm reputation, and CEO.